Ockham's Razor and Solipsism
It is easier for me to assume that the world around me exists than to assume my mind is the only thing that exists. Applying Ockham's Razor (with my limited experience with the terms and their applications) to the question of existence then solipsism should be the default answer (only assumption is the existence of the self, whereas other views build on this assumption). I don't like this, obviously solipsism is incorrect, but since Ockham's Razor is such a widely applied tool for science (or philosophy, actually) then how can we apply it reasonably when passing by the first application of the tool? (In order to effectively chop a tree into firewood you need to cut down the tree to begin with.)
Thoughts?
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It's not a law, it doesn't work for everything.
It isn't a law, but it is applied to many, if not most, principles. I was looking for more evaluative reasoning than "it doesn't apply here." As maybe there is a way to interpret the assumptions of view the assumptions that leds itself to Ockham's Razor defeating solopsism.
Edit: "As maybe there is a way to interpret the assumptions that lends itself to Ockham's Razor not supporting solipsism."
I guess what I meant to say is why are you trying to apply it here if you even acknowledge that what you're trying to apply it to is incorrect? Also the way you have asked the question is very confusing. I know it's ironic but you might want to simplify your OP.
In order to apply it as a feasible rule it must be consistent. I'm not trying to apply it to either prove solipsism false or prove solipsism true (little interested in trying to prove negatives), just a thought game in which I am trying to provide Ockham's Razor in a context that it does not fail/stop at its first application.
I was just recently approached with the conundrum and haven't been able to think of a way to use the rule in any other way than to support the... cough theory(?).... of solipsism. I was just curious if anyone had any alternate viewpoints which would counter this absurd, but interesting, one.
Thanks for the input though, feeling lonely in this thread
From Wikipedia: "The principle states that among competing hypotheses that predict equally well, the one with the fewest assumptions should be selected. Other, more complicated solutions may ultimately prove to provide better predictions, but—in the absence of differences in predictive ability—the fewer assumptions that are made, the better."
I'm not philosopher but as I understand it, Occam's razor doesn't really apply here since there are obvious differences between the predictive powers of solipsism and realism. If the mind is the only thing you can assume to exist, all other factors are subject to change at any time for no reason. With solipsism, you wouldn't, for instance, be able to predict that once you close your eyes and open them again, these words will still appear on your computer screen or even that your computer screen will still be there. You can with realism. The better predictive value makes it a better theory.
I don't really know shit about solipsism(first I'm hearing of it), sometimes I question whether I really exist but this is probably because I'm a crazy person. I just didn't want this thread to suffer the same fate as my thread about Shrodinger's cat that recieved zero replies(besides maybe a 'wut?') and is now lost to the ages.
Thanks for the input! Information I hadn't considered.
But, if predictibilty is an inconsiquential design of the self wouldn't that render the predictibilty argument null? Taking into account Last Thursdayism for example, things that you remember in order to form the basis for a prediction are just products of your brain to begin with. Perhaps my computer screen wasn't there yesterday?
Again, I don't believe this stuff. Just a fun thought game
I don't think the predictability clause cares about what the basis of your predictions are, only how accurate your predictions turn out to be. It doesn't matter whether or not your computer screen was in fact there yesterday and here today. All that matters is that you can use the fact that it seemed to have been there yesterday and seems to be here today to predict that it will seem to be here tomorrow. Realism can account for that consistency there; solipsism can't.